Wednesday, October 15, 2014

16 October 2014: Does access to NREGA mitigate negative impacts of early childhood shocks? Evidence from Andhra Pradesh, India

Aparajita Dasgupt
Population Council

Date: October 16, 2014
Time: 02:30 P.M.

Venue:
Mezzanine Floor,
Akbar Bhawan,
Satya Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi-110021(India)

Location:

Monday, October 13, 2014

14 October 2014: What Was Indian Planning? Observations from the International History of Nehruvian Planning

David C Engerman
Brandeis University

Date: October 14, 2014
Time: 03:00 P.M.

Venue:
Committee Room
Centre for Policy Research,
Dharma Marg, Chanakyapuri,
New Delhi–110021(INDIA)

Location:

View Larger Map

Monday, September 15, 2014

18 September 2014: Revealed Preference for Open Defecation: Evidence from a New Survey in Rural North India

Dean Spears
Rice Institute and Centre for Development Economics

Abstract:
Despite economic growth, government latrine construction, and increasing recognition among policy-makers that it constitutes a health and human capital crisis, open defecation remains stubbornly widespread in rural India. Indeed, 67% of rural Indian households in the 2011 census reported defecating in the open. We present evidence from new survey data collected in villages in five states in India: Bihar, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. We find that rural households do not build inexpensive latrines of the sort that commonly reduce open defecation and save lives in Bangladesh, Southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa. Many survey respondents‘ behaviour reveals a preference for open defecation: over 40% of households with a working latrine have at least one member who defecates in the open. In the sample from the four largest states, more than half of people in households which own a government latrine defecate in the open. We apply a demographic model of latrine use which predicts that if the government were to build a latrine for every rural household that lacks one, without changing sanitation preferences, most people in our sample in these states would nevertheless defecate in the open. Further evidence supports a preference for open defecation: many survey respondents report that open defecation is more pleasurable and desirable than latrine use. Among people who defecate in the open, a majority report that widespread open defecation would be at least as good for child health as latrine use by everyone in the village. These findings suggest that intensifying existing policies of latrine construction will not be enough to substantially reduce open defecation. Policy-makers in India must lead a large scale campaign to promote latrine use.

Date: September 18, 2014
Time: 03:00 P.M.

Venue:
Seminar Room (First Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)

Location:

View Larger Map

Thursday, September 4, 2014

4 September 2014: Monks, Gents and Industrialists: The Long Run Impact of the Dissolution of the English Monasteries

Sebastian Vollmer
University of Goettingen

Abstract:
In this paper we undertake an investigation of the long-run economic impact of the dissolution of the English monasteries by Henry VIII in the 1530s. This event is plausibly linked to the ”rise of the gentry”, the commercialization of agriculture and political and economic change in early modern England potentially facilitating its precocious industrialization. To measure the dissolution we digitized the Valor Ecclesiasticus, the census Henry commissioned of monastic incomes in 1534 and use monastic income at the parish level from the Valor as a measure of the local impact of the dissolution. We show that parishes which the dissolution impacted more were more likely to have a textile mill in 1838, tended to have more mills and greater mill employment. We also show that they tended to have a lower proportion of their labor force in agriculture in 1831 and a higher proportion in retail trade. In addition we demonstrate that parishes where the dissolution had a greater impact had more gentry in 1700, were more likely to have land enclosed by parliament and had more innovative agriculture as measured by patents. We show these results are robust to controlling for many other potential determinants of the location and extent of industry and for a variety of strategies for accounting for unobservables. The results are consistent with Tawney’s famous thesis of the ”rise of the gentry” but extend it by making the link between social change and the industrial revolution.

Date: September 4, 2014
Time: 03:00 P.M.

Venue:
Seminar Room (First Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)

Location:

View Larger Map

Monday, September 1, 2014

5th September 2014: Fertility Limits on Local Politicians in India

Abhishek Chakravarty
University of Essex

Abstract:
We examine the demographic implications of fertility limits on local politicians. Several Indian states disbar individuals with more than two children from contesting Panchayat and municipal elections. These two-child limits are intended to decrease fertility among the constituents through a role-model effect and by incentivizing individuals who intend to run for elections in the future to plan smaller families. We find that fertility limits on elected representatives decrease voters fertility. However, they also increase the sex ratio at birth, especially in states and for socioeconomic groups with a stronger preference for sons. We show that households are willing to give up higher order births to remain eligible for political office, but only if they have the desired number of sons. Our results point towards a novel source of demographic influence: political leaders.

Date: September 5, 2014
Time: 11:30 A.M.

Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)

Location:

View Larger Map

Wednesday, August 13, 2014

14 August 2014: Misallocation, Internal Trade, and the Role of Transportation Infrastructure

Jose Asturias
Georgetown University

Abstract:
In this paper, we quantify the welfare impact of the construction of the Golden Quadrilateral (GQ) in India. To do so, we extend the endogenous variable markups trade model of Atkeson and Burstein (2008) into a multi-region setting in which asymmetric states trade with each other. To estimate key parameters of the model, we use a rich micro-level dataset constructed from manufacturing and geospatial data. We then simulate the improvement in road quality consistent with the construction of the GQ. We find aggregate gains of 2.15% for all of India. We also decompose these gains into Ricardian and pro-competitive components. Lastly, we find that welfare effects vary substantially across states, including negative welfare impacts for some states far away from the GQ.

Date: August 14, 2014
Time: 03:00 P.M.

Venue:
Seminar Room (First Floor)
Department of Economics,
Delhi School of Economics,
New Delhi-110007(INDIA)

Location:

View Larger Map

Wednesday, August 6, 2014

8th August 2014: Misallocation, Internal Trade, and the Role of Transportation Infrastructure

Jose Asturias
School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Georgetown University

Abstract:
In this paper, we quantify the welfare impact of the construction of the Golden Quadrilateral (GQ) in India. To do so, we extend the endogenous variable markups trade model of Atkeson and Burstein (2008) into a multi-region setting in which asymmetric states trade with each other. To estimate key parameters of the model, we use a rich micro-level dataset constructed from manufacturing and geospatial data. We then simulate the improvement in road quality consistent with the construction of the GQ. We find aggregate gains of 2.15% for all of India. We also decompose these gains into Ricardian and pro-competitive components. Lastly, we find that welfare effects vary substantially across states, including negative welfare impacts for some states far away from the GQ.

Date: August 8, 2014
Time: 11:30 A.M.

Venue:
Seminar Room 2
Indian Statistical Institute Delhi Centre,
7, S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg,
New Delhi-110016 (INDIA)

Location:

View Larger Map